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TAXATION OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES:
INTERPRETING SECTION 104(a)(2) AFTER
THE REVENUE RECONCILIATION ACT OF
1989
Abstract: The Internal Revenue Service and the courts have wavered on whether puni-

tive damages are taxable under the Internal Revenue Code. Just after the Fourth Circuit
boldly declared that punitive damages are taxable, Congress amended section 104(a)(2) to
tax punitive damages in cases where no physical injury is involved. Neither the courts nor
the Internal Revenue Service have answered the question whether punitive damages in
cases that do involve physical injury are taxable. This Comment examines the language of
the amended statute and the policies leading to its enactment, and proposes that punitive
damages be taxed without regard to the nature of the underlying injury.

Betty Gardener purchases a defectively manufactured lawnmower
and is injured while using it through no fault of her own. The manufacturer marketed the mower knowing that it was defective and probably would cause serious injury to the user. Betty prevails in the
ensuing tort action and the jury awards her $10,000 in compensatory
damages and $100,000 in punitive damages. Section 104(a)(2) of the
Internal Revenue Code provides that damages are excluded from
income if they are received "on account of" personal injury.
Although "on account of" suggests causation, it is unclear whether
"but for" causation or "sufficient" causation is the appropriate standard to apply. If the punitive damages are received on account of her
personal injury, Betty would report none of the $100,000 as income.
Conversely, if the punitive damages are received because of the manufacturer's culpability rather than on account of Betty's injury, Betty
must report the $100,000 as income and pay $31,000 in taxes.1 Thus,
the interpretation of section 104(a)(2) is crucial to taxpayers who have
been awarded punitive damages in cases involving physical injury. In
either case, Betty will not report the $10,000 in compensatory damages as income.
This Comment explores the statutory scheme of Internal Revenue
Code (the Code) section 104(a)(2), which excludes from gross income
any damages received on account of personal injuries, as it relates to
punitive damages. Part I summarizes the historical attempts of the
courts and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to determine whether
punitive damages are excluded by section 104(a)(2). It also presents
two important recent developments in the law of punitive damages1. For purposes of the examples in this Comment, the amount of taxes payable will be
calculated using the highest tax bracket for married individuals filing jointly, without taking any
deductions or exemptions into account.
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the case of Miller v. Commissioner, in which the Fourth Circuit held
that punitive damages are not excluded under section 104(a)(2), and
the 1989 amendment to section 104(a)(2), which specifically denies
exclusion to punitive damages in cases that do not involve physical
injuries. This Comment concludes that punitive damages are not
excluded under section 104(a)(2) and are therefore taxable income.
Part II analyzes the language of section 104(a)(2) and concludes that it
is likely that the plain language of section 104(a)(2) does not exclude
punitive damages, but that any ambiguity can be resolved in favor of
this interpretation by using common canons of statutory construction.
Part III provides additional support for the conclusion that punitive
damages are taxable income by examining tax and tort policies which
indicate that punitive damages should not be excluded under section
104(a)(2).
I.

TAXATION OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES UNDER SECTION
104(a)(2)

This section introduces section 104(a)(2) and the relevant cases and
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) rulings interpreting it. First, this section provides a brief history of the frequently conflicting views of Congress, the courts, and the IRS on the taxation of punitive damages.
Second, this section presents the recent amendment to the statute,
which leaves unanswered the question of whether punitive damages in
physical injury cases are taxable, and the case of Miller v. Commissioner, which correctly resolves this question in favor of taxability
based on the language and intent of the statute.
A.

Historical Treatment of Punitive Damages Under the Internal
Revenue Code

Section 104(a)(2) governs the taxability of damages. The language
of section 104(a)(2) is unclear as to whether punitive damages are taxable under the statute. Interpretation of section 104(a)(2) has been
difficult and the results of the IRS, the Tax Court, and other courts
inconsistent.
1.

The Statutes and Regulations: Income and Exclusions

The Code presumes that all income is taxable unless specifically
excluded under another section of the Code.2 Section 104(a)(2) specifically excludes "damages received on account of personal injuries or
2. I.R.C. § 61(a) (1989) ("Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, gross income means
all income from whatever source derived.").
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sickness." 3 If punitive damages are income and are not received on

account of personal injuries or illness, they are taxable. The Supreme
Court has held that punitive damages are income under the Code.4
The controversial question thus becomes whether punitive damages
are received "on account of" personal injuries or illness so as to be
excluded under section 104(a)(2).
Neither the statute nor the regulations answer the question whether
punitive damages are received on account of personal injuries and are
therefore taxable. The regulations define "damages received on

account of personal injury" as an amount received through prosecution of a legal suit or action based upon tort or tort-type rights, or a

settlement in lieu of a suit.5 Thus, personal injury is not limited to
physical injury, but includes such torts as defamation and alienation of

affection, as well as violations of constitutional rights.6 Whether punitive damages are received "on account of" personal injury, however, is
a question that the courts and IRS have failed to answer.

2. Canons of Construction
Four judicial canons of construction are commonly employed in
determining whether section 104(a)(2) excludes punitive damages in
cases involving physfical injury. First, courts should not disregard the
statute's plain meaning except to prevent an absurd result or one that

is contrary to legislative intent.7 Second, when interpreting the Code,

courts should construe exclusions from income narrowly. 8 Third,
statutes should be construed to further their underlying purposes.'
Finally, courts should not interpret a statute in a way that renders

certain language meaningless. 10 These maxims sometimes yield con3. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1986). "[G]ross income does not include . . . the amount of any
damages received... on account of personal injuries or sickness." The purpose of this section
was to exclude damages that serve to make the taxpayer whole from a previous loss. Starrels v.
Commissioner, 304 F.2d 574, 576 (9th Cir. 1962).
4. Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass .Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955) (punitive damages in an
antitrust case are income and therefore taxable absent specific congressional intent to exclude
them), reh'g denied, 349 U.S. 925 (1955); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.61-14(a) (1989).
5. Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c) (1989).
6. See Bent v. Commissioner, 835 F.2d 67, 69 (3d Cir. 1987); Roemer v. Commissioner, 716
F.2d 693, 697 (9th Cir. 1983).
7. See Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917); Miller v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 330,
340-41 (1989), rev'd, 914 F.2d 586, 590 (4th Cir. 1990); see also J. SANDS, STATUTES AND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTON § 46.01 (4th ed. 1984).
8. Commissioner v. Miller, 914 F.2d 586, 590 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Commissioner v.
Jacobson, 336 U.S. 28, 49 (1949).
9. See supra note 7.
10. "[E]Ifect must be given, if possible, to every word, clause and sentence of a statute."
SANDS, supra note 7, § 46.06.
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flicting results, and it is unclear whether judges apply them in reaching
their conclusion, or merely include them in the opinion as support for
the conclusion already reached.' 1
3.

The Conflicting Interpretationsof Section 104(a)(2)

Judicial and administrative interpretations of section 104(a)(2) have
been inconsistent. For example, in 1984, the IRS ruled that wrongful
death punitive damages are not excluded under section 104(a)(2)
because they are not awarded on account of personal injuries. In contrast, an Alabama district court held that punitive damages under the
state's wrongful death statute are awarded on account of personal
injury and are therefore excluded under section 104(a)(2).
a. The IRS and Revenue Ruling 84-108
The present position of the IRS is that punitive damages are not
excluded under section 104(a)(2) because they are not received on
account of personal injury. 2 Revenue Ruling 84-108 considered
whether amounts awarded to a surviving spouse and child under an
Alabama wrongful death statute are excludable when the statute provided exclusively for payment of punitive damages.13 Thus, the IRS
was faced with two issues. The first was whether damages labeled
"punitive" by the legislature are necessarily punitive in nature. The
IRS accepted the Alabama legislature's label of "punitive" attached to
wrongful death damages because under the Alabama statute the
amount of damages was based solely on the degree of the defendant's
fault and not on the loss sustained by the survivors.' 4 Once they were
determined to be punitive, the second issue was whether the damages
were taxable, or excluded under section 104(a)(2). The IRS ruled that
punitive damages are not excluded under section 104(a)(2) because
11. See I B. BITrKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF: INCOME, ESTATES, AND GIFrs § 4.2.1
(1981).
12. Rev. Rul. 84-108, 1984-2 C.B. 32. This represents a change in position for the IRS
because in Revenue Ruling 75-45, the IRS ruled that payments in lieu of punitive and
compensatory damages for wrongful death are excludable under section 104(a)(2). Rev. Rul. 7545 C.B. 1975. See Morrison, Getting a Rule Right and Writing a Wrong Rule: The IRS Demands
a Return on All Punitive Damages, 17 CONN. L. REV. 39, 45-47 (1984) (suggesting that these
experts misinterpreted Revenue Ruling 75-45 by selectively reading portions of the ruling
literally).
13. The ruling presented two situations in which courts awarded damages in wrongful death
actions, one in Virginia and the other in Alabama. The Virginia statute limited the award to
compensatory damages, but the Alabama statute allowed exclusively for punitive damages. This
Comment deals only with situations involving punitive damages, such as those orovided by the
Alabama statute.
14. Rev. Rul. 84-108, 1984-2 C.B. 32.
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they are determined by the defendant's degree of fault and are, therefore, not received on account of personal injury.15 Furthermore, the
IRS cited Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass16 as holding that punitive
damages are taxable. 7 Therefore, the IRS concluded that punitive
damages were not excluded from the wife and child's gross income.18
b.

The Alabama District Court Responds

In Burford v. United States,19 the Alabama district court sharply
criticized Revenue Ruling 84-108 and held that damages received
under the Alabama wrongful death statute were excludable from gross
income.2 0 The Alabama court disputed both the conclusion that damages under the statute were purely punitive and thus unrelated to personal injury, and the conclusion that punitive damages are not
excluded under section 104(a)(2). Burford had brought a wrongful
death action against a university hospital after her husband died under
its care.21 The claim was settled before trial and Burford included that
22
amount in income, but later amended the return seeking a refund.
When the IRS failed to respond, Burford sued for a refund.2"
The Burford court attacked Revenue Ruling 84-108 as an "unwarranted administrative amendment of the clear language of the ...
Code" on two grounds.24 First, the court disagreed with the IRS's
conclusion that the damages in a wrongful death action are received
on account of the defendant's wrongdoing alone.2" It reasoned that
amounts received in such actions are received on account of personal
injuries because wrongful death actions only arise upon a person's
death.2 6 Second, the court criticized the IRS's reliance on Glenshaw
Glass because it does not support the conclusion that punitive damages
are taxable.2 7 The Alabama court held that the phrase "any damages
received.., on account of personal injury" expressed clear congres15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
death
26.
27.

Id.
348 U.S. 426 (1955).
Rev. Rul. 84-108, 1984-2 C.B. 32.
Id
642 F. Supp. 635 (N.D. Ala. 1986).
Id at 638.
Id at 636.
Id
Id
Id
Id at 638 n.5 (citing several Alabama cases in support of the proposition that wrongful
actions are actions for personal injuries).
Id. at 638.
Id; see supra note 4.
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sional intent to exclude wrongful death proceeds, whether compensa28
tory or punitive.
The Burford court also offered policy reasons for excluding punitive
damages in wrongful death cases. 29 The court cited equity problems
arising from disparate treatment of taxpayers in different states based
on the varying wording of wrongful death statutes.3" For example,
under Revenue Ruling 84-108, taxpayers in Alabama would be taxed
on wrongful death proceeds because damages carry a "punitive" label,
whereas taxpayers in other states might avoid taxation because their
state's statute labels the damages "compensatory." The court further
noted that other provisions in the Code evince a broad policy of
according preferential tax treatment to death benefits. 3
B. Recent Changes: Statutory and Judicial
Two nearly simultaneous developments recently added new dimensions to the tax law governing punitive damages. First, Congress
amended section 104(a) to bar exclusion of punitive damages that are
not received in connection with physical injury. Second, just before
the amendment became effective, the Fourth Circuit accepted the
IRS's position in Miller v. Commissioner, interpreting section
104(a)(2) to deny exclusion to punitive damages.3 2 The Miller case
remains relevant after the amendment because the amendment did not
change the basic language of section 104(a)(2), which excludes damages received on account of personal injury.
1.

The Section 104(a)(2) Amendment and Legislative History

In 1989 Congress modified section 104(a)(2) when it passed the
Revenue Reconciliation Act (the Act).33 The unamended body of section 104(a)(2) excluded "damages received on account of personal
injury or sickness." 3 4 The amendment specifically places punitive
damages outside the scope of section 104(a)(2) when no physical
injury is involved.3 5
28. Burford v. United States, 642 F. Supp. 635, 637 (N.D. Ala. 1986).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 637 n.4. Horizontal equity requires that similarly situated taxpayers be similarly
taxed. See infra note 111 and accompanying text.
31. Burford, 642 F. Supp. at 638 n.6 (citing preferential treatment of life insurance, employee
death benefits up to $5000, and property acquired by devise or inheritance).
32. Commissioner v. Miller, 914 F.2d 586 (4th Cir. 1990).
33. I.R.C. § 104(a) (1989) ("Paragraph 2 shall not apply to any punitive damages in
connection with a case not involving physical injury or physical sickness.").
34. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1989).
35. Id.
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The legislative history somewhat clarifies congressional intent but is
of limited usefulness because the joint committee issued only the
report for the House bill, which was not enacted. The House originally proposed an amendment limiting the scope of section 104(a)(2)
to physical injury cases regardless of whether the damages were compensatory or punitive. The House committee wrote an explanatory
report for this proposal. The conference committee that drafted the
enacted amendment, however, provided no such explanation and simply published the House committee's report with the amendment,
despite the fact that the enacted amendment differed significantly from
the House bill because it distinguished between punitive and compensatory damages, as well as physical and nonphysical injuries.
The House report is indicative of legislative intent, however,
because the conference committee published the House report along
with the enacted bill. The report indicates that Congress intended to
tax punitive damages in nonphysical injury cases. This should not be
taken to mean that the House intended to exclude punitive damages in
cases involving physical injury. Three factors support this conclusion.
First, the committee expressed concern over broad judicial interpretation of the exclusion that excluded nonphysical injury damages.3 6 Second, the House committee's main focus was to eliminate favorable tax
treatment in cases not involving physical injuries or illness.3 7 Finally,
the report stated that "no allocation [would be] required among multiple claims if more than one type of claim was alleged in a personal
injury action." 3 8 Thus, if a claim had its origin in physical injury, all
damages flowing therefrom would be treated as payments involving
physical injury or illness.3 9
2.

The Miller Case: Are Punitive Damages Received "On Account
Of" PersonalInjuries?

In Miller v. Commissioner,4I the Tax Court held that punitive damages awarded in a Maryland defamation case were excludable under
36. H.R. REP. No. 247, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 2144 (1989) ("some courts have held that the
exclusion applies to damages in cases involving employment discrimination and injury to
reputation where there is no physical injury or sickness"). The committee was concerned with
broad judicial application of section 104 in cases of employment discrimination because those
cases often involved liquidated damages which are at least partially punitive. Id. Some courts
have excluded liquidated damages from gross income. See, ag., Rickel v. Commissioner, 900
F.2d 655 (3rd Cir. 1990); Thompson v. Commissioner, 866 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1989).
37. H.R. REP. No. 247, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 2144 (1989).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. 93 T.C. 330 (1989) (Miller 1), rev'd, 914 F.2d 586 (4th Cir. 1990).
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the pre-amendment section 104(a)(2).4 1 The Fourth Circuit reversed
the Tax Court and remanded the case for allocation between punitive
and compensatory damages. 2 The Fourth Circuit's decision in Miller
that punitive damages are taxable represents judicial acceptance of the
IRS's position in Revenue Ruling 84-108. This position presents a viable alternative to the uncertainty created by the 1989 amendment.
a.

The Tax Court: Miller v. Commissioner (Miller I)

In Miller v. Commissioner,4 3 the Tax Court held that punitive damages in a Maryland defamation case were received "on account of"
personal injury and were therefore excluded under section 104(a)(2)."
The jury awarded Miller $500,000 in compensatory and $450,000 in
punitive damages.4 5 The parties settled for $525,000 after attorney's
fees and costs.46 Miller did not report all of the settlement amount as
income. The IRS claimed that she owed $249,106 in taxes on her
unreported income.4 7 Some portion of this amount represented her
claim for punitive damages. The Tax Court, however, sided with
Miller and held that she could exclude punitive damages from gross
income under section 104(a)(2).4 8
The Tax Court held that punitive damages are received "on account
of" personal injury and are therefore excludable under section
104(a)(2).49 First, the court noted that Congress was aware of punitive damages when it enacted section 104(a)(2) and yet did not limit
the exclusion to compensatory damages."
Second, the court reasoned that under the plain meaning of section
104(a)(2), punitive damages would be received "on account of" personal injury because personal injury is a cause of punitive damages in a
defamation case. The Miller I court explained that the plain meaning of the statutory language "on account of" is "[f]or the sake of,"
"because of," or "by reason of," and that these three phrases suggest
causation. 2 The court adopted the tort concept of "but for" causa41. Id. at 341.
42. Commissioner v. Miller, 914 F.2d 586, 592 (4th Cir. 1990) (Miller 11). The court noted
that the statute had been amended, but that it was not yet effective. See id. at 588 n.4.
43. 93 T.C. at 330.
44. Id. at 335-41.
45. Id. at 330-33.
46. Id. at 333-34.
47. Id. at 331.
48. Id. at 341.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 338.
51. Id. at 340-41.
52. Id. at 339.
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tion 3 and concluded that both personal injury and the defendant's
culpability play causal roles in awarding punitive damages. 4 Thus,
the court concluded that personal injury is a cause of punitive damages although personal injury alone cannot cause them to be
awarded.5 5
The Tax Court reasoned that the plain meaning of section 104(a)(2)
should not be ignored unless it caused absurd results or violated congressional intent. The court found that interpreting section 104(a)(2)
to exclude punitive damages would not be absurd or contrary to legislative intent because punitive damages serve to compensate the plaintiff for intangible harms and attorneys' fees.56 The court also failed to
find express congressional intent to deny exclusion to punitive damages in the legislative history of section 104(a)(2). 57
The dissenting opinion objected to the majority's plain meaning
approach and urged the court to construe the statute narrowly and to
follow its previous policy of treating damages separately. The dissent
called upon the court to follow the well-recognized principle that
exclusions are to be narrowly construed, 58 and therefore to limit the
exclusion under section 104(a)(2) to compensatory damages. 59 The
dissent also argued that compensatory and punitive damages should be
treated separately based on their underlying nature, rather than treating both as having the single cause of personal injury.' Analyzing
punitive and compensatory damages separately would have led to the
conclusion that, in Maryland, punitive damages serve no compensatory purpose whatsoever and thus cannot be excluded.6 1
b.

The Fourth Circuit: Commissioner v. Miller (Miller II)

In Commissioner v. Miller,62 the Fourth Circuit accepted the dissent's reasoning in Miller I and reversed the Tax Court.6 3 The court
rejected the Tax Court's plain meaning approach because it found the
language of section 104(a)(2) ambiguous as to which form of causation
53. Under the "but for" rule, something is the cause of an event if the event would not have
occurred but for that thing. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, TORTS 266 (5th ed. 1984).
54. Miller I, 93 T.C. at 339.
55. Id at 340.
56. Id at 341.
57. Id.
58. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
59. See 93 T.C. at 352 (Whalen, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 351.
61. Id. at 346-51.
62. 914 F.2d 586 (4th Cir. 1990).
63. Id. at 589-92.
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was intended.'
The court agreed with the Tax Court that "on
account of" suggested causation, but could not agree that "but for"
causation is the appropriate standard.6 5 The court suggested that
"sufficient" causation analysis is just as plausible as "but for" causation analysis.6 6 The court pointed out that under sufficient cause analysis, personal injury is not a cause of punitive damages because it is
67
not enough by itself.
In light of the statute's ambiguity, the court turned to two common
canons of statutory interpretation-the principles of narrow construction and underlying purpose. First, the Miller II court adopted the
principle rejected by the Tax Court that all exclusions are to be narrowly construed.6 8 Under this principle, section 104(a)(2) would deny
exclusion to punitive damages because it is the more restrictive interpretation of the statute. Second, the court found that interpreting "on
account of" to deny exclusion to punitive damages comported better
with the underlying purpose of the section, which is to exclude from
gross income only those amounts that compensate the taxpayer for a

loss. 69 By definition, punitive damages do not serve this function. The

court found additional support for its conclusion in the heading of the
section, "Compensation for Injuries or Sickness," 7 ° indicating that
only compensatory payments were excluded under the section.
The court limited its holding that punitive damages are taxable to
only those damages that are purely punitive and serve no compensatory purpose.7 It distinguished the Miller case from Burford72 in
which the court relied on Alabama cases holding that punitive damages in wrongful death actions compensate for personal injury.73 In
Miller II, Maryland law clearly indicated that punitive damages
received in defamation cases were solely punitive.7 4
64. Id. at 589-90.
65. Id. at 589.

66. Id. at 589-90.
67. Id. at 590.
68. Id.
69. Id.

See also 1 B. BIrrKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFrs
§ 13.1.4 (1981) (the rationale for § 104(a)(2) is that recovery only makes the taxpayer whole by
compensating for a loss).
70. Miller I, 914 F.2d at 590 (emphasis added by Fourth Circuit).
71. Id. at 591. For the purposes of this Comment, unless otherwise indicated, "punitive
damages" will refer to those punitive damages that have no compensatory elements. For a
discussion of the compensatory nature of punitive damages and the undesirability of relying on
labels, see generally, Morgan, Old Torts, New Torts and Taxes: The Still Uncertain Scope of
Section 104(a)(2), 48 LA. L. REV. 875 (1988).
72. Burford v. United States, 642 F. Supp. 635 (N.D. Ala. 1986).
73. Id. at 637-38.
74. Miller H1, 914 F.2d at 591.
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II. INTERPRETING SECTION 104(a)(2)
Although the amendment to section 104(a)(2) indicates that punitive damages are taxable in cases not involving physical injury, it does
not indicate whether punitive damages are taxable in cases involving
physical injury. Neither the IRS nor the courts have applied the
amended version of section 104(a)(2). This Comment suggests that
courts should interpret the statute to deny exclusion to punitive damages regardless of whether physical or nonphysical injuries are
involved, based on the specific language and purpose of section
104(a)(2). This Comment recommends the analytic approach used by
the Miller II court to construe the unamended section 104(a)(2)." 5
The Miller II court first applied common canons of construction to the
language of the statute and concluded that its meaning is ambiguous.
The court then employed extrinsic aids to interpret the ambiguous language and concluded that section 104(a)(2) does not exclude punitive
damages.
A.

Amended Section 104 and Physical Injury Punitive Damages

Both the language of amended section 104(a)(2) and the purpose of
its enactment indicate that physical injury punitive damages are not
excluded under section 104(a)(2). First, the plain meaning of
amended section 104(a)(2) implies that physical injury punitive damages are not excluded under section 104(a)(2), but the language is
somewhat ambiguous. Furthermore, any interpretation of the language of amended section 104(a)(2) still depends on whether punitive
damages are received on account of personal injury. Second, the purpose of the amendment to section 104(a)(2) indicates that physical
injury punitive damages should not be excluded from income.
L

The Plain Meaning of Amended Section 104(a)(2)

The plain meaning of the language of the amended section 104(a)(2)
denying exclusion to nonphysical injury punitive damages tends to
indicate that punitive damages are taxable, but this language is more
fairly characterized as ambiguous. The language may be interpreted
to exclude punitive damages in cases involving nonphysical injury
while not addressing physical injury punitive damages at all. The language may, however, also be interpreted as specifically barring nonphysical injury punitive damages from exclusion while excluding
75. See id. at 589-90.
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physical injury punitive damages along with all other compensatory
damages.
The plain meaning of the phrase "shall not apply to punitive damages received in cases not involving physical injury" 76 is that if the
injury is not physical, punitive damages are not excluded and are
therefore taxable. The amendment to section 104(a)(2) is silent with
respect to punitive damages in cases involving physical injury. However, for two reasons, the explicit exception of nonphysical punitive
damages does not give rise to the inference that physical injury punitive damages are excludable. First, the amendment denies exclusion
only to nonphysical injury punitive damages. Had Congress intended
also to exclude physical injury punitive damages, it would have explicitly done so. Second, the rules of logic do not support an inference
that physical injury punitive damages are excluded.
Congress has chosen to construct the Code with great detail. If
Congress intended physical injury punitive damages to be excluded,
they would have said so.7 7 For this reason, it is reasonable to conclude
that the statute does not imply that physical injury punitive damages
are to be excluded under section 104(a)(2) because it does not say so.
Second, the rules of logic do not support an inference that denying
exclusion to punitive damages in nonphysical injury cases necessarily
implies exclusion of physical injury punitive damages." Punitive
damages have been categorized as involving either physical injury or
nonphysical injury. If Congress says only that punitive damages are to
be taxed in cases not involving physical injury, then it cannot logically
be inferred that in physical injury cases, punitive damages should be
excluded. Therefore, if the language is to be construed logically, it
must be construed as inconclusive with regard to punitive damages in
physical injury cases.
Although the two factors suggest that Congress did not intend to
exclude physical injury punitive damages, there is some cause for
doubt. If pre-amendment section 104(a)(2), contrary to the holding in
Miller II, excluded punitive damages, then the amendment could be
76. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1989).
77. See Texas Farm Bureau v. United States, 725 F.2d 307, 308 (5th Cir. 1984), reh'g denied,
732 F.2d 437, cert denied, 469 U.S. 1106 (1985); Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. United
States, 654 F.2d 35, 42 (Ct. Cl. 1981).
78. If the premise "some S is not P" is true, whether "some S is P" is true or false is
indeterminate. Substituting the language of section 104(a) it can be said that: If some punitive
damages are not excluded, it cannot be determined that some punitive damages are excluded.
See I. CoPI, INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC 180 (1986).
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interpreted as carving out an exception for punitive damages received
in cases not involving physical injury.
Thus, Congress' failure to deny exclusion to punitive damages in
physical injury cases would mean that they are excluded under section
104(a)(2). All damages would be excluded under section 104(a)(2)
except punitive damages in cases of nonphysical injury. This interpretation, however, is not sound because it falsely assumes that punitive
damages are excluded by the phrase "any damages received on
account of personal injuries or illness." 7 9 If, as Miller 11 suggests,
punitive damages are not received "on account of" personal injury,8 0
then the amendment does not carve out a narrow exception to a broad
exclusionary provision in section 104(a)(2). Thus, the plain meaning
of section 104(a)(2) tends to indicate that physical injury punitive
damages are not excluded thereby, but its meaning is somewhat
ambiguous.
2. The Purpose of the Amendment
The legislative history of the amendment to section 104(a)(2) indicates that Congress did not intend to exclude punitive damages in
cases involving physical injury. Whether the purpose of the amendment was to limit exclusion of damages under section 104(a)(2) to
physical injury cases or to deny exclusion to punitive damages in nonphysical injury cases, excluding punitive damages in physical injury
cases violates that purpose.
The legislative history indicates that Congress intended to deny
exclusion to punitive damages in cases not involving physical injury
and probably did not intend to exclude them in cases that do involve
physical injury. The legislative history is somewhat confusing because
the only damages under consideration by either the House or the Senate were damages involving nonphysical injury. The House committee
proposed that nonphysical punitive and compensatory damages be
taxed.8 1 The enacted amendment, however, removed compensatory
damages in nonphysical injury cases from the taxable list. Thus,
although it is not at all clear what the purpose of the amendment is, it
is clear what that purpose is not. The purpose of the amendment to
section 104(a)(2) is to tax nonphysical injury punitive damages, not to
change the tax treatment of damages in cases involving physical
79. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1989); see Miller, 914 F.2d at 591; see also Rickel v. Commissioner,
900 F.2d 655, 660 (3rd Cir. 1990) ("any compensatory damages are excludable") (emphasis
added).
80. Commissioner v. Miller, 914 F.2d 586, 590 (4th Cir. 1990).
81. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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injury. Thus, the pre-amendment purpose of section 104(a)(2), which
is to provide tax relief for compensatory payments, is still controlling.
Three tax practitioners, however, have concluded that the purpose
of the amendment was not only to make punitive damages taxable in
cases not involving physical injury, but also to specifically provide for
exclusion of punitive damages received in cases involving physical
injury.8 2 These authors have concluded that the House report is evidence of congressional intent to exclude punitive damages from gross
income in cases involving physical injury under section 104(a)(2). 3
One author cites the committee report as saying that the inquiry is
restricted to determining whether the injury is physical or not, and as
long as the injury is physical, any compensatory or punitive damages
received are excluded from gross income.8 4 But, the author claims
that the phrase "all damages flowing therefrom" indicates that physical injury punitive damages are excluded.
The author's conclusion is incorrect because the phrase "all damages flowing therefrom" appears to refer only to allocation in cases
involving multiple claims. Even if it refers to punitive damages, being
"treated as [a payment] involving physical injury" does not require
exclusion under section 104(a)(2) because the test is whether the damages are received "on account of personal injury."8 " Whether punitive
damages are characterized as payments involving physical injury or
nonphysical injury is therefore irrelevant. Thus, "all damages flowing
therefrom" probably refers to cases involving both physical injuries
and nonphysical injuries.
In summary, neither the plain meaning nor the purpose of amended
section 104(a)(2) indicate that physical injury punitive damages should
be excluded. Therefore, whether physical injury punitive damages are
excluded will be determined by pre-amendment section 104(a)(2) and
whether punitive damages are received on account of personal injury.
82. See Jaeger, Taxation of Punitive Damage Awards After the Revenue Reconciliation Act of
1989, TAXES 364-65 (May, 1990); Schnee & Evans, Punitive Awards May Be Taxed, But
Compensatory Payments Retain Their Tax-Free Status, 18 TAXATION FOR LAWYERS 364 (1990).
83. See Jaeger, supra note 81; see also Schnee & Evans, supra note 81.
84. See Jaeger, supra note 81 (relying on H.R. REr'T. No. 247, 101st Cong., IstSess. (1989))
("as long as a recovery originates from a physical injury or sickness, all the damages that flow
therefrom are treated as payments involving physical injury").
85. "No allocation of damages is required among multiple claims if more than one type of
claim is alleged in a personal injury action." See House Rep. No. 247, supra note 35 and
accompanying text. Therefore, when read in context, "all damages that flow therefrom" refers to
damages flowing from physical as well as nonphysical injuries. See Rickel v. Commissioner, 900
F.2d 655, 659 (3rd Cir. 1990) (citing Threlkeld v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1294, 1299 (1986)).
However, the reference here was only to distinguishing between injury to professional reputation
and injury to personal reputation.
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B.

The Meaning of "on Account of"

The phrase "on account of personal injury" remains unchanged in
the amended statute and remains critical in determining whether punitive damages are excluded under section 104(a)(2). The plain meaning
of the language is not clear, however, because it does not indicate
whether "but for" or "sufficient" causation are appropriate. Therefore, other canons of construction should be used to determine the
proper construction of the statute. The common canons of construction lead to the conclusion that punitive damages should not be
excluded under section 104(a)(2).
L

Plain Meaning

Although the plain meaning of "on account of" suggests causation,
it does not suggest which of the several forms of causation analysis are
appropriate.8 6 The "but for" and "sufficient" causation forms, which
lead to opposite conclusions, prompted the Miller II court to characterize "on account of" as ambiguous."7 A third and more common
form of causation, combining both "but for" and "sufficient" causation, suggests that punitive damages are not received "on account of"
personal injury.
For personal injury to be a cause of punitive damages under the
"but for" 8 test, it must be true that punitive damages would not have
been awarded but for the personal injury. 9 Conversely, personal
injury is not a cause if punitive damages would have been awarded
without it. Personal injury is a cause of punitive damages under the
"but for" analysis because punitive damages cannot be awarded absent
a personal injury. 90
On the other hand, under a "sufficient" cause approach, the personal injury alone must be sufficient to cause the award of punitive
damages. Punitive damages are not awarded for personal injury
alone9 1 and, therefore, personal injury is not a sufficient cause of punitive damages. Thus, these two interpretations render opposite conclusions as to the meaning of "on account of."
86. Commissioner v. Miller, 914 F.2d 586, 589 (4th Cir. 1990) (MillerI1).
87. Id. at 590.
88. See supra text accompanying notes 50-54. "But for" causation is also known in other

disciplines as necessary cause. See I. Cori,supra note 77, at 428-31.
89. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, TORTS 266 (5th ed. 1984).

90. See id. at 14 ("The greater number of courts have said that [punitive damages] are limited
to cases in which actual compensatory damages are found by the jury.").
91. See Miller II, 914 F.2d at 594.
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Cause, as it is used in the ordinary sense, however, encompasses
both necessary and sufficient cause, 92 so the most plausible interpretation of "on account of" would require both necessary and sufficient
causation. 93 Personal injury is a necessary, 94 but not a sufficient, cause
of punitive damages. Under this approach personal injury is not a
cause of punitive damages.
Thus, although it is more likely that "on account of" personal injuries means that personal injuries must be a necessary and sufficient
cause of punitive damages, the language itself does not demand that
conclusion. Therefore, because the plain meaning of the statute is
ambiguous, other canons of construction should be used to decide
whether punitive damages are excluded under section 104(a)(2).
2. Applying the Other Canons of Construction
Other canons of construction indicate that section 104(a)(2) as
amended denies exclusion to punitive damages. First, the principle of
narrowly construing exclusions to gross income supports that conclusion. Second, the underlying purpose of the statute is to provide tax
relief to taxpayers who receive damages to compensate for personal
injuries. Finally, interpreting the language of section 104(a)(2) to deny
exclusion of all punitive damages does not violate the canon that statutes should not be construed so as to render language meaningless.
a. Exclusions Narrowly Construed
Read narrowly, section 104(a)(2) does not exclude punitive damages, 95 regardless of whether physical or nonphysical injuries are
involved. The Miller 11 court construed the pre-amendment statute
narrowly; 96 no ruling or case has yet applied the principle of narrow
construction to the amended section 104(a)(2). The narrower interpretation that should be adopted would deny exclusion to physical
injury punitive damages. Interpreting section 104(a)(2) to exclude
punitive damages in physical injury cases would be the broader interpretation and would thus be rejected under the principle of narrowly
construing the statute.
92. See I. Copi, supra note 77, at 428-29.
93. Id. at 428-3 1.
94. See supra note 89 (punitive damages not awarded absent an actual injury).
95. "The exemptions.., are specifically stated and should be construed with restraint in light
of the same policy." Miller I, 914 F.2d at 591 (citing Commissioner v. Jacobson, 336 U.S. 28,
49 (1949)).
96. Id. at 590.
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b.

The Underlying Purpose of Pre-Amendment Section 104(a)(2)

Punitive damages should not be excluded under section 104(a)(2)
because the underlying purpose of section 104(a)(2) is to provide tax
relief only to taxpayers who are compensated for losses they sustained
in torts cases. The Miller I1 court found evidence of this purpose in
prior decisions9 7 and in the section's title, "Compensation for Injuries
or Sickness." 98 The overall structure of section 104 and its legislative
history also indicate that the purpose of section 104(a)(2) is to provide
tax relief to persons receiving compensation for losses incurred.
Punitive damages should not be excluded under section 104(a)(2)
because they do not compensate the plaintiff, and the purpose of section 104 is to provide tax relief only for compensatory payments. 99
The Supreme Court and other courts have held that punitive damages
represent a windfall to the recipients and do not compensate them for
a loss."° Therefore, excluding punitive damages in cases of physical
injury and nonphysical injury comports with the underlying purpose
of section 104.01
Evidence of section 104(a)(2)'s purpose of providing tax relief only
for compensatory payments is found in the structure of the statute, the
legislative history, and prior decisions. Several courts have acknowl10 3
edged such a purpose. 102 For example, in Starrels v. Commissioner,
the Ninth Circuit held that section 104(a)(2) excluded damages that
serve to make the taxpayer whole from a previous loss."
Two aspects of the statute's structure also indicate its purpose to
lessen the tax burden on compensated taxpayers. First, the title of
section 104 is "Compensation for injuries or sickness."10' 5 Second, the
other subsections of section 104 exclude only compensatory pay97. See id
98. Id. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
99. But see Morgan, supra note 70, at 928 (courts and commentators have said that some
punitive damages are actually compensatory).
100. See, eg., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974); Commissioner v. Miller,
914 F.2d 586, 590-91 (4th Cir. 1990) (Miller11); Exxon Corp. v. Yarema, 69 Md. App. 124, 516
A.2d 990 (1986), cert. denied, 309 Md. 47, 522 A.2d 392 (1987). But see W. PROSSER & W.
KEETON, supra note 52, at 12 (punitive damages sometimes compensate for attorneys' fees).
101. Courts do not distinguish between physical and nonphysical injury in holding that
punitive damages do not compensate the plaintiff for a loss. See, e.g., Miller II, 914 F.2d at 590;
Starrels v. Commissioner, 304 F.2d 574, 576 (9th Cir. 1962).
102. See, eg., Miller II, 914 F.2d at 590; Starrels, 304 F.2d at 576.
103. 304 F.2d at 576.
104. Id.
105. Miller II, 914 F.2d at 590 (emphasis added by Fourth Circuit).
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ments 10 6 Thus, both the title and the nature of the other subsections
indicate that section 104's purpose is to exclude only certain compensatory payments. Therefore, it is likely that Congress intended to
exclude only compensatory damages under section 104(a)(2). Otherwise, section 104(a)(2) would be unique within section 104 in excluding payments that do not compensate the recipient.
Finally, the legislative history of pre-amendment section 104(a)(2)
provides additional evidence that its purpose is to provide tax relief for
compensatory payments only. The Senate Committee on Finance
described section 104 as "excluding from gross income the following
types of compensation payments for personal injuries ...(2) damages
received under a suit or settlement of a claim." 10° 7 Thus, there is evidence of congressional intent to limit the application of the original
section 104(a)(2) to compensatory damages only.
Interpreting section 104(a)(2) to exclude punitive damages in cases
involving physical injury would be inconsistent with the statute's basic
purpose of providing tax relief to injured parties that have been compensated. Thus, it should be interpreted to deny exclusion to physical
injury punitive damages.
c. Not Rendering Language in a Statute Meaningless
Interpreting "on account of" personal injuries to deny exclusion to
punitive damages under section 104(a)(2) appears to render the
amendment's language meaningless. If punitive damages are not
excluded under section 104(a)(2), then arguably the language saying
that nonphysical injury punitive damages are not excluded is redundant. To avoid rendering the amendment meaningless, it seems that
section 104(a)(2) would have to be interpreted to exclude punitive
damages generally, except in cases not involving physical injury.
There is, however, an alternative explanation for the amendment.
At the time section 104(a)(2) was amended, courts had interpreted the
section to exclude some punitive damages. For example, prior to the
amendment, several courts had held that liquidated damages with a
significant punitive component were excluded under section
106. For example, section 104(a)(3) excludes accident and health insurance proceeds for
personal injuries or sickness. I.R.C. § 104(a)(3) (1989). Section 104(a)(4) excludes pensions and
annuities for personal injuries or sickness resulting from active IRS in the armed forces.
§ 104(a)(4). And section 104(a)(5) excludes disability pay for U.S. workers who are injured in a
terrorist attack. § 104(a)(5). Finally, section 104(a)(1) excludes compensation for personal
injuries under a "workmen's compensation act." § 104(a)(1).
107. See Morrison, supra note 12, at 60 (citing S. REP.No. 646, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982),
reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 4580, 4582) (emphasis added).
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104(a)(2).1 ° ' Thus, the words of limitation added to section 104(a) by
the Act, denying exclusion to nonphysical injury punitive damages,
had meaning when enacted because they were intended to reinforce
section 104(a)(2). They were intended to narrow judicial interpretation of the statute that had allowed exclusion of punitive damages
despite the fact that no punitive damages were awarded "on account
of" personal injury under a proper construction of the statute. Therefore, interpreting section 104(a)(2) to deny exclusion to all punitive
damages does not render it meaningless. Unfortunately, Congress'
artless amendment of the statute may have unintentionally validated
some courts' conclusions that physical injury punitive damages are
excluded under section 104(a)(2).
III.

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS INDICATE THAT
PUNITIVE DAMAGES SHOULD NOT BE
EXCLUDED

Even if the language and purpose of section 104(a)(2) do not clearly
indicate congressional intent to deny exclusion to all punitive damages, several policy considerations do. First, the sound tax policy of
fairness, l9 which is prevalent throughout the Code, also suggest that
all punitive damages be taxable. Second, the tort policies behind
awarding punitive damages 110 support the view that punitive damages
should be taxed.
A.

Tax Policy

Taxing punitive damages is fair from both a horizontal and vertical
equity standpoint. Horizontal equity requires similarly situated people be taxed in a. similar manner. Vertical equity requires that a person with higher income pay more taxes.
If the amended section 104(a)(2) taxes all punitive damages, rather
than just those involving nonphysical injury, the requirements of horizontal equity will be met. There is no rational basis for preferring
those sustaining a physical injury to those who do not.1"' Thus, hon108. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
109. See W. KL.iN, J. BANKMAN, B. BTrrKER, & L. SToKE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION

19-23 (8th ed. 1990).
110. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 52, at 9-12.
111. See e.g., Threlkeld v. Commissioner, 848 F.2d 81, 83 (6th Cir. 1988); Roemer v.
Commissioner, 716 F.2d 693, 697 (9th Cir. 1983). Although there is no basis for preferring
plaintiffs with physical injuries to plaintiffs with nonphysical injuries, the administrative costs or
costs of compliance may rise because of such a distinction. It is not clear that these costs would
be significant. With a clear policy reason for not making such a distinction, a possible rise in
compliance costs is worth risking.
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zontal equity requires that people receiving awards or settlements in
cases involving physical injury be taxed in the same manner as people
receiving damages in cases not involving physical injury. To conclude
that punitive damages in physical injury cases should be excluded
while those received in cases not involving physical injury are taxable
would violate the principle of horizontal equity.
The concept of horizontal equity also requires similar tax treatment
of plaintiffs receiving similar damages in different states. 112 For example, a person in Alabama receiving wrongful death damages should be
taxed as would a person in California receiving wrongful death damages. 1 13 Horizontal equity is maintained by applying the states' substantive law to determine whether damages are punitive or
compensatory in nature.1 14 Horizontal equity does not require that a
taxpayer receiving punitive damages in one state be taxed like taxpayers receiving compensatory damages in other states. In fact, this
would violate the concept of vertical equity.
Vertical equity requires that all punitive damages be taxed because
they raise the income of the recipient over the income of others who
are similarly situated except for the punitive damages. Vertical equity
does not require that compensatory damages be taxed because
although compensatory damages may increase taxpayers' incomes,
those increases are offset by losses the taxpayers have already sustained. Punitive damages, however, are a windfall to recipients11 5 and
to that extent should be taxed no differently than winnings from
gambling.
B.

Tort Policy

Taxing all punitive damages is consistent with the policies1 16 behind
awarding them. Under tort law, there are three policy goals behind
awarding punitive damages. Punitive damages serve to punish the
tortfeasor, by acting as a deterrent to the tortfeasor and ensuring
future compliance with the law. They also prevent "would be"
tortfeasors from committing similar wrongs. The secondary goals are
to provide an incentive to injured parties to bring actions, and to com112. See Burford v. United States, 642 F. Supp. 635 (N.D. Ala. 1986).
113. Id. at 637 n.4 (characterizing damages as punitive based solely on the labels attached by
the legislature would result in disparate treatment of taxpayers in different states).
114. See Morrison, supra note 12, at 73-80.
115. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 52, at 14.
116. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 52, at 11-15.
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pensate injured parties for attorneys' fees. 117 Taxing punitive damages
does not undermine these three goals. First, to the extent punitive
damages punish tortfeasors, requiring recipients to pay taxes on the
damages does not diminish the deterrent and punishment effects on
payors. Second, taxing punitive damages only lessens injured parties'
incentive to bring suit without eliminating it. Finally, taxing punitive
damages in most cases does not leave tortfeasors uncompensated for
attorneys' fees.
At current tax rates, taxing punitive damages also does not materially lessen plaintiffs' incentive to sue. Theoretically, the high cost of
litigation causes many significant violations to go unpunished." 8 One
function of punitive damages is to neutralize this disincentive. Taxing
punitive damages to recipients does not defeat the incentive because a
portion of the award remains after taxation as an incentive.1 1 9 Furthermore, courts can instruct juries to consider the tax consequences
of their awards to particular plaintiffs so they may adjust the award
1 20

accordingly.

Finally, taxing punitive damages does not necessarily deprive plaintiffs of the funds necessary to pay attorneys' fees. Taxing punitive
damages would create a shortfall only if the entire award of punitive
damages represents compensation for attorneys' fees. Although attorneys' fees may be a component of such an award, they generally do not
represent the whole amount. Therefore, it is likely that a thirty-one
percent reduction in punitive damages would not leave most plaintiffs
12 1
inadequately compensated for legal costs and attorneys' fees.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Punitive damages in physical injury cases should not be excluded
under section 104(a)(2) because the plain meaning of the language
indicates that Congress did not intend for them to be excluded. Fur117. Attorneys' fees are generally not available under the American system. Fleischmann
Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Company, 386 U.S. 714, 717 (1967); see also W. PROSSER &
W. KEEroN, supra note 52, at 12.
118. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 52, at 12.
119. Assuming a marginal tax rate of 31%, the plaintiff still retains 69% of the award. See
supra text accompanying note 1.
120. Some courts provide instructions, but others are reluctant to do so. Miller v.
Commissioner, 93 T.C. 330, 343 (1989), rev'd, 914 F.2d 586 (4th Cir. 1990).
121. Furthermore, the lack of compensation for legal costs and attorneys' fees are considered
a shortcoming in the American Civil Rules. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 52, at
12. Thus, it does not seem appropriate to correct the error through a provision in the tax laws,
especially when excluding punitive damages conflicts with sound tax policies. A more direct
approach would be to change the civil rules to provide for recovery of attorneys' fees.
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thermore, although the amended statute does not explicitly address
physical injury punitive damages, courts may not ignore the underlying purpose of section 104. Justice Holmes once said that a policy
change "that induces the enactment, may not be set out in terms, but
it is not an adequate discharge of duty for courts to say: We see what
you are driving at, but you have not said it, and therefore, we shall go
on as before."12' 2
The underlying purpose of section 104 is to exclude from income
damages that serve to compensate taxpayers for losses. Punitive damages awarded either in cases of physical or nonphysical injuries do not
compensate taxpayers and therefore should not be excluded under section 104(a)(2). Additionally, taxing punitive damages involving physical and nonphysical injuries is fair and consistent with sound tort
policies. Therefore, all punitive damages should be taxed to the
recipient.
Craig Day

122. Johnson v. United States, 163 F. 30, 32 (1st Cir. 1908).
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